During the past few decades, the fraction of the equity market owned directly by individuals declined significantly. The same period witnessed investment trends that include the growth of indexing as well as shifts by active managers toward lower fees and more index-like investing. I develop an equilibrium model linking these investment trends to the decline in individual ownership, interpreting the latter as a reduction in noise trading. Active management corrects most noise-trader induced mispricing, and the fraction left uncorrected shrinks as noise traders' stake in the market declines. Less mispricing then dictates a smaller footprint for active management. 
I ask whether the above trends in investment management are consistent with the downward trend in individual equity ownership and an associated decline in noise trading. The basic hypothesis is that less noise trading implies a lower capacity for profitable active management. I explore the validity of this hypothesis by developing an equilibrium model for active management in a market with noise traders. The model is simple in many respects but captures the simultaneity between the amount of mispricing and the amount of active management. I then calibrate the model and find it supports the consistency between the investment trends noted above and a decline in noise trading.
The model implies that active management corrects most of the noise-trader induced mispricing that would otherwise exist. A fraction of the mispricing remains uncorrected, because active managers are impeded by both trading costs and idiosyncratic risk. The remaining mispricing allows active management to earn positive alpha at the expense of noise traders. The fraction of mispricing uncorrected by active management shrinks as the fraction of the equity market owned by noise traders declines. With less mispricing, active management must then have a smaller footprint.
I. Active Management with Noise Traders
The model has four types of agents: active managers, investors, noise traders, and intermediaries. In a market with many assets, active managers identify and exploit opportunities to outperform the market benchmark and, in particular, maximize their information ratios. Each manager acts competitively, conditioning on prices as well as his fund's size, while facing convex costs of intermediation when deviating from benchmark asset weightings. Competitive investors allocate their stock-market wealth across the active funds and a passive market-index fund so as to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the resulting combination. Noise traders buy individual stocks directly and do not invest in either active funds or index funds. Intermediaries receive trading costs incurred by active managers but otherwise play no role in the model. The aggregate stock-market wealth of the noise traders equals the fraction h times the total value of the stock market; the investors have aggregate stock-market wealth equal to the fraction 1 − h of total stock market value.
The model presented joins a literature on delegated portfolio management that is too extensive to survey here. Two studies that are perhaps most closely related, in that they analyze equilib-rium prices in an economy with noise traders and delegated management, are Garcia and Vanden (2009) and Petajisto (2009) . Garcia and Vanden assume a single risky asset, imperfect competition among managers, and endogenous information acquisition. Petajisto has a given active manager maximize the information ratio while the manager assumes his resulting portfolio characteristics determine investors' overall allocation to active management. In addition to possessing these differences from the current model, neither study includes convex costs associated with establishing active (non-benchmark) positions.
A. Stocks
The market contains N stocks, and the total supply of each stock equals one share. The model considers a single investment period. Stock i has share price p i at the beginning of the investment period and value x i at the end of the period (including dividends). A share in the market portfolio has end-of-period value x m = (1/N) N i=1 x i and price p m = (1/N) N i=1 p i . I assume that
with E(η i ) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N. I further assume that the η i 's have a risk structure given by
where E(z) = E( i ) = 0, Cov( i , j ) = 0 for all i = j, and
I assume that (1/N) N i=1 i ≈ 0, so that the rate of return on the market portfolio is well approximated as r m = µ m + z − 1,
where µ m =x m /p m , withx m = (1/N) N i=1x i . The rate of return on stock i is given by
from which we see that β i = Cov(r i , r m )/Var(r m ) = 1. The market-adjusted return on stock i is
The alpha for stock i is therefore equal to
wherep
is the expected end-of-period value discounted by the expected market return-the stock's CAPM fair value given that β i = 1. The variance of stock i's market-adjusted return is
From equations (2), (3), and (9) note that a stock with a relatively higher price has both higher variance of next-period value and lower variance of return. This assumption allows active managers' relative allocations across stocks to depend simply on deviations between prices and fair values (a result presented in the next subsection). Given this specification of variances and the resulting active allocations, the model is most sensibly applied in a setting where prices are normalized to comparable magnitudes in the cross section (e.g., scaled by a fundamental such as book value).
B. Active Managers
There are M active managers. At the beginning of the period, manager j sets a proportional fee rate equal to f (j) . Investors then decide to invest in aggregate the dollar amount W (j) with that manager, whose fee revenue is thus f (j) W (j) . Given W (j) , manager j chooses allocations across individual stocks to maximize his information ratio, defined as net alpha divided by the standard deviation of market-adjusted return.
Each manager can replicate the market index at zero cost but pays trading costs in order to deviate from those benchmark allocations. These costs represent compensation to liquidity-providing intermediaries for taking short-lived positions to facilitate the ultimate market clearing between managers and noise traders. 5 Specifically, define the active weight
where φ
(j)
A,i is manager j's weight in stock i, and φ m,i is stock i's weight in the market portfolio. (Note
, and the associated trading cost is denoted as C
i . I assume that the proportional trading cost is given by C
is the fraction of stock i's total market value represented by D (j) i , and c is a constant. In other words, the proportional trading cost is linear in the amount traded. A linear function for the proportional trading cost in a given stock is entertained, for example, by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013) . That study examines portfolio transition trades and concludes that a linear function fits the data only slightly less well than a nonlinear square-root specification. Those authors also model differences in c across stocks, whereas I suppress such cross-sectional variation for simplicity.
With the cost specification in equation (11), we will see below that the manager faces decreasing returns to scale with respect to the size of his assets under management. The model of Berk and Green (2004) features decreasing returns to scale, and a number of studies have investigated the presence of fund-level decreasing returns to scale using mutual fund data. Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) report evidence consistent with fund-level decreasing returns, though not with strong statistical significance when employing methods that avoid econometric biases. 6 Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2007) conclude that trading costs present an important source of scale diseconomies for mutual funds.
The M managers possess identical information, which consists of the p i 's, thex i 's, σ, and c. Each of the M managers takes those quantities and W (j) as given. I assume M is finite but large enough to make the price-taking assumption plausible. Each manager chooses allocations across individual stocks to maximize his information ratio, and the following proposition characterizes the results of that maximization.
where
Trading costs incurred equal fee revenue:
Manager j's resulting portfolio has net alpha equal to
market-adjusted volatility equal to
and information ratio equal to
Proof: See Appendix.
We see from equation (12) that the active allocation to asset i is simply a cross-sectional constant, a (j) , multiplied by the deviation of the price from the stock's CAPM fair-value. The manager's resulting alpha and information ratio are both decreasing in assets under management,
confirming the presence of decreasing returns to scale as discussed earlier. The presence of the square root of W (j) in the denominator of a (j) in equation (13) implies that as a given price-taking manager receives more money to manage, he increases φ
-the dollar size of his active position in stock i-but each additional dollar is deployed less actively than the previous one. Note from equations (16) and (18) that a manager's net alpha and information ratio are increasing in ψ, defined in equation (14). As will be discussed later, ψ summarizes the overall amount of mispricing present in the cross-section of stocks.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (16) is the gross alpha, before fees and trading costs, since equation (15) implies that trading costs lower return by the same amount as the fee rate, f (j) . The latter result-that the fraction of the manager's assets spent on trading is equal to the fee rate-occurs because convex trading costs counterbalance a manager's incentive to scale up active positions to lessen the importance of the fee. To see this, let φ denote the vector of the manager's active weights, let α denote the vector of the N assets' alphas, and let Σ denote the variance-covariance matrix of the assets' market-adjusted returns. Note that the elements of φ sum to zero. With no trading costs and a fee rate of f, the manager's information ratio is
For any active weights such that φ α > 0, the manager's incentive is then to multiply those weights by an arbitrarily large scalar, so that I simply approaches the zero-fee information ratio, φ α/ √ φ Σφ. With convex trading costs such as the specification in equation (11), scaling up the weights becomes increasingly costly. The scaling of φ is then helpful only to the point where the fee rate is exactly counterbalanced by trading costs as a fraction of assets under management, i.e. where fee revenue equals total trading costs. This implication is consistent with the empirical evidence of Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2013) , who conclude that mutual funds'
annual trading costs as a fraction of net asset value are comparable in magnitude to the funds' expense ratios.
C. Investors and Managers in Equilibrium
Investors allocate their stock-market investments across the active managers and a market index fund so as to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the resulting combination. Investors do not concern themselves with the individual stockx i 's, which can be treated as known only by the active managers. Investors simply assess active managers' overall portfolio α (j)
A 's and σ
(j)
A 's. In the main formulation of the model, I assume investors make those assessments correctly. An alternative scenario in which investors err is discussed later.
Each investor chooses an allocation across active managers that produces the maximum information ratio of the resulting active portfolio. That active portfolio is then combined with the market index fund to achieve the highest overall Sharpe ratio. I assume the number of investors is large relative to the number of funds (i.e., thousands of funds, millions of investors), and wealth is sufficiently disperse across investors such that each investor takes each manager's α as given when making allocation decisions. In other words, investors treat their own individual allocations as having no effect on the W (j) 's in equations (16) 
through (18).
A key feature of the resulting competitive equilibrium is that each manager receives the same fee revenue, f (j) W (j) . To see why, first note that the active (market-adjusted) returns for all managers are perfectly correlated with each other, as equation (12) shows that managers' vectors of active weights are spanned by a common vector. Second, each manager's information ratio, I
A , is a decreasing function of f A 's, the manager with the higher I (j)
A will dominate the other and attract any money flowing to either of the two. As the manager with the higher I A 's are the same across managers, and this condition implies, from equation (18), that f (j) W (j) is the same across managers.
Managers thus face unit elasticity with respect to their fee rate; those charging a higher rate receive proportionately less money to manage, such that the fee rate is irrelevant to the fee revenue. 7 If g denotes the common level of fee revenue, f (j) W (j) , received by each manager, then the weight of fund j in the aggregate portfolio of active managers is
wheref is the harmonic mean of fee rates,
The alpha and market-adjusted return volatility of the aggregate active portfolio are given by
noting that equation (22) follows from the previously discussed perfect correlation among the managers' active returns.
Let y denote the fraction of investors' aggregate stock-market wealth that is allocated to active management. Because investors share the same objective-maximimum Sharpe ratio-each investor can achieve that maximum by allocating the fraction y to the aggregate portfolio of active management. In doing so, each investor takes α A and σ A as given in the competitive equilibrium.
Therefore, as shown by Treynor and Black (1973) , the optimal y from an individual investor's perspective is given by
The value of y that delivers equation (23) in equilibrium, for a given mean fee ratef, is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The active allocation y is given by
Given that each of the M funds receives fee revenue g = f (j) W (j) , the aggregate fee revenue
where W m is the aggregate value of all stocks. Observe from equation (25) that the previously discussed fee irrelevance for individual managers also occurs in aggregate with respect to the mean fee,f. A higherf simply produces a proportionately lower aggregate allocation to active management, leaving the productf y-and thus aggregate fee revenue-unchanged. This result affords a simple explanation for the number of active managers. If the cost to be a manager is equal to κ, then entry of managers occurs to the point where fee revenue covers that cost, and thus
The following proposition gives the aggregate active portfolio's alpha, market-adjusted volatility, information ratio, and active weight in stock i. The latter three quantities are expressed conditional on the aggregate allocation, y, as well as in alternative forms that rely on the previous proposition.
Proposition 3. The aggregate portfolio of the active managers has net alpha equal to
and information ratio, α A /σ A , equal to
The portfolio's active weight in stock i is given by
Both α A and σ A are proportional to the average fee,f , which drops out of the information ratio, I A , in the second equality in (29). Note that I A is increasing in the mispricing measure ψ.
The positive net alpha in equation (27) comes at the expense of the noise traders, whose aggregate portfolio must earn negative gross alpha. This statement follows directly from the identity that the aggregate portfolio of non-indexed investments must earn zero gross alpha, as noted for example by Sharpe (1991) and Fama and French (2010) . Those studies also point out that an implication of that identity is a negative net alpha for active management in aggregate, given positive costs of active management. It is important to realize, however, that such a statement involves defining active management as all non-indexed investment. In the model here, that definition would have "active" management encompass the investors' allocation to active managers as well as the holdings of the noise traders.
D. Equilibrium Pricing
The degree of mispricing, summarized by ψ defined in equation (14), depends on stock prices.
We see above that ψ enters the allocation to the aggregate active portfolio, which in turn enters that portfolio's market-adjusted volatility, information ratio, and stock weights. Fully understanding those equilibrium quantities requires understanding the model's implications for prices. Accomplishing the latter relies on the market-clearing condition,
where φ m,i is stock i's market weight, φ H,i is the stock's weight in the aggregate stock portfolio of the noise traders, and φ S,i is the stock's weight in the aggregate investor portfolio. The investor weight φ S,i comprises the allocations to active and passive management:
The noise-trader weight φ H,i is treated as exogenous and potentially creates mispricing that active management exploits. I assume φ H,i ≥ 0 (no short selling by the noise traders). The role of φ H,i in a stock's equilibrium price is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium price of stock i is
is the price for stock i that would prevail in the absence of active management (i.e., when y = 0),
To understand whyp i is the price when there is no active management, suppose the investors were to allocate all of their stock-market wealth to passive management, so that φ S,i = φ m,i . Substituting φ m,i for φ S,i in equation (31) The price-correction coefficient, θ, is increasing in h, meaning that a larger fraction of noise traders in the stock market results in less correction of the mispricing they create.
8 Note also that θ is increasing in the trading-cost parameter, c, implying that lower liquidity results in less price correction. This implication is consistent with evidence that stock prices are more efficient when liquidity is higher, as presented in empirical studies by Subrahmanyam (2008, 2011) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2013) . The value of θ is also increasing in σ, so that higher idiosyncratic volatility results in less price correction. Evidence that higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with greater mispricing is presented, for example, by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2013) .
The value of θ is likely to be small as long as the noise-trader fraction, h, is not close to 1. In the examples calibrated in the next section, θ is less than 0.001. The main reason θ is small is that both the number of managers, M, and the number of stocks, N, are fairly large relative to the respective quantities they divide in the denominator of the second term inside the brackets in equation (34). Note that if both M → ∞ and N → ∞ as other quantities are held constant, then θ → 0. As N → ∞ the non-market volatility of stocks can be diversified away, presenting potential asymptotic arbitrage in the manner of Ross (1976) . Trading costs impede such arbitrage, but as M → ∞, or equivalently as κ → 0, those trading costs become vanishingly small.
(Recall that κ is the cost to be an active manager.) The reason is that proportional trading costs decrease with the amount traded, as in equation (11), and the trading amount of each individual manager's benchmark deviation becomes infinitesimal as the number of managers grows. As the opportunities available to each manager approach costless asymptotic arbitrage, the fraction of uncorrected mispricing must vanish, and θ → 0. While this comparative static result correctly states the effect of increasing M as c is held constant, I argue later when calibrating the model that it is more reasonable to view the ratio (c/M) as remaining stable when M trends upward.
A small value of θ implies that active management eliminates virtually all of whatever mispricing the noise traders might produce. Active management thereby provides a substantial externality to society if noise traders would otherwise produce significant mispricing. The mispricing that remains nevertheless supports the active management industry. How large is that industry? Recall that active management's allocation in equation (25) depends on fee rates. For a sufficiently lowf , active management can always receive a large allocation, as long as aggregate fee revenue supports the existence of at least one manager. How much fee revenue gets collected is another question.
We see from equation (25) that the fee revenue depends on the amount of equilibrium mispricing, summarized by the value of ψ defined in equation (14).
The mispricing measure ψ depends on the p i 's and the α i 's. Substituting from equations (7) and (32) into equation (14) gives
The average of (p i −p i )/p m across the N assets equals 0, since summing thep i 's in equation (8) gives Np Mispricing in this model refers to the deviation of a stock's price from its CAPM fair-value,p i , and that fair-value defined in equation (8) depends on µ m , which is (one plus) the expected return on the overall market. Whether or not µ m also reflects fair pricing of the aggregate expected endof-period value,x m , is outside the model's scope. Noise traders might also exert systematic effects that impact the market's expected return as well as its volatility (e.g., Delong, Shleifer, Summers, Waldman, 1990, and Shiller, 2000) . I take the market's expected return and volatility as exogenous to the model, and in the calibration presented later I simply specify those quantities as constant over time.
E. Investor Error
The model assumes that investors have rational expectations and correctly assess α A and σ A , which are the characteristics of the aggregate active portfolio relevant to the allocation decision.
The expression for y in equation (25) Deviating from the optimal active allocation affects equilibrium prices. The price-correction coefficient, θ in equation (34), takes a different value-denote it θ * -and thus the mispricing measure ψ in equation (35) takes a different value-denote it ψ * . Suppose the active allocation y * is λ times the allocation that is optimal when the mispricing measure under that allocation equals ψ * . The following proposition characterizes the resulting prices and the aggregate active portfolio.
Proposition 5. Denote the aggregate allocation to the optimal portfolio of active managers as y * .
When y * equals λ times the allocation that is optimal under the equilibrium prices that result under y * , the value of θ in equation (32) is replaced by
The aggregate portfolio of the active managers has net alpha equal to
where α A , σ A , and I A are given in equations (27) through (29), and ψ * is given by equation (35) with θ replaced by θ * . Proof: See Appendix.
Consider, for example, an over-allocation to active managment, so that λ > 1. One effect is greater price correction as compared to the case when λ = 1, since θ * is decreasing in λ. The alpha on the active portfolio is also less than when the active allocation is optimal, since α * A is also decreasing in λ. The decrease in alpha comes from two sources, which can be understood by examining the alpha for a given manager in equation (16). One source is the greater price correction, resulting in a lower value of ψ. The other source is the effect of decreasing returns to scale, so that a greater allocation to active management raises each manager's W (j) , holding fees constant. Both sources work together to produce an inverse relation between alphas and the allocation to active management. Over-allocation can make the net alpha negative, in which case the fees (paid to managers) and trading costs (paid to intermediaries) are then more than can be made up by the positive gross alpha, despite managers' optimizing with what they are given to manage. The gross alpha is always positive for investors, negative for noise traders, and zero for the weighted combination.
An inverse relation between alphas and the amount of money allocated to the active management industry-industry-level decreasing returns to scale-is proposed and analyzed by Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) . Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) find empirical evidence in support of industry-level decreasing returns for actively managed equity mutual funds.
II. Modeling Noise Trader Investment
Within the model, noise traders invest directly in individual stocks rather than through either active or passive managers. In aggregate they own fraction h of the equity market. My empirical proxy for h is the fraction of U.S. equity owned directly by individuals, as displayed in Figure 1 .
The other relevant property of noise traders is the extent to which their aggregate allocations to individual stocks deviate from those justified by fair values. If across stocks the magnitudes of p i −p i are sufficiently large, a nontrivial amount of those deviations can remain uncorrected even though the fraction uncorrected (θ) is small. The weight φ H,i in the aggregate portfolio of the noise traders determines thep i 's as in equation (33). I view the empirical counterpart for φ H,i as stock i's aggregate weight in the direct stock holdings of individuals.
Portfolios of stock held directly by individuals are notoriously undiversified, as observed four decades ago in studies by Blume, Crockett, and Friend (1974) , Lease, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum (1974) , and Blume and Friend (1975) . Further evidence is provided in more recent studies. For example, Polkovnichenko (2005) finds that among households with liquid financial assets in excess of $1 million (in 1989 dollars), the households that hold stocks directly typically hold 15 stocks or less. In the remaining income cohorts, the same study finds households that directly own stocks typically hold three stocks or less. 9 Polkovnichenko also finds that the same households whose direct holdings are undiversified often nevertheless hold a substantial fraction of their financial wealth in diversified mutual funds.
While the typical individual's direct stock holdings are undiversified, the more relevant issue for pricing is the extent to which the low diversification survives aggregation. If the degree to which a given stock is under-weighted or over-weighted is independent across individuals, then those deviations average out when aggregating across many individuals and have little if any effect on prices. In contrast, if there is commonality in direct stock holdings across individuals, the low diversification of investors' portfolios does not completely wash out in aggregate and can therefore impact prices ).
Evidence of significant commonality in individuals' stock holdings is reported by Feng and Seasholes (2004) , Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008) , and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009). The Barber et al. study also concludes that various shared behavioral biases play important roles in producing the commonality. Barber and Odean (2008) find that investors generally favor "attentiongrabbing" stocks that have appeared in news stories or have experienced extreme returns or trading volume. Consistent with that evidence, Fang and Peress (2009) find that stocks with high media coverage earn low returns, especially stocks with relatively high individual ownership (i.e., stocks with low ownership by 13F filers). In general, the empirical evidence suggests individual investors respond to various events and stimuli in similar ways, due to behavioral biases or constraints on their ability to obtain and process information not readily available.
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The evidence for commonality across individual investors is significant but does not fully pin down the degree to which low diversification at the individual level survives aggregation. I adopt a specification that admits a wide range for that outcome. The first step is to observe that the relative pricing error (p i −p i )/p m appearing in the mispricing measure ψ in equation (35) can be written
using equations (8) and (33) along with the relation p m =x m /µ m . I assume that the price and payoff of each stock i is normalized by expected end-of-period value so thatx i =x m , and thus
In other words, with this normalization, mispricing depends simply on the extent to which aggregate noise-trader allocations deviate from equal weights.
Next define v i = Nφ H,i . I approximate the cross-sectional distribution of the v i 's with a continuous Weibull density for v. The density is defined for v ≥ 0, consistent with the assumption that noise-traders do not short. The Weibull distribution has two parameters, determining the distribution's scale and shape.
11 In this application, E(v) = 1, given that N i=1 φ H,i = 1, so there is one free parameter k that determines the distribution's shape. The resulting family of densities is illustrated in Figure 3 . As k becomes large, the density concentrates around v = 1, yielding the completely diversified portfolio that puts equal weights on all stocks. As k becomes small, the mass concentrates toward zero and skewness increases, yielding an undiversified portfolio that puts low weights on most stocks and large weights on a relative few. The mispricing measure ψ in equation (35) can be written as
using equation (41) and the definition v i = Nφ H,i . The analog in terms of the continuous v is
I take equation (43) as a reasonable proxy for equation (42) for large N, which is nearly 7,000 in the calibration below.
III. Trends and the Model

A. Data Trends
The model defines h as the fraction of equity owned by noise traders, and in the data I take h to be the fraction of equity owned by individuals. My objective is to focus on trends rather than fluctuations.
12 In order to isolate the trend in individual ownership, I specify the values for h as the points on a linear trend fit through the actual series of individual holdings, displayed as the dotted line in Figure 1 . The quantity σ A in the model is the active portfolio's market-adjusted return volatility, and in the data I take σ A to be the tracking error of the aggregate portfolio of represents of stock i's total market capitalization. The relevant question is the extent to which that intermediation cost depends on how many other active managers wish to take a similar active position. It seems more likely that growth in the number of managers competing for intermediation in the same direction increases the cost of taking a position representing any given fraction δ i of the stock, as opposed to leaving that cost unaffected. I assume for tractability that the cost increase is simply proportionate, so that c/M is constant.
To specify the value for c/M, I rely on the first equality in (28), which implies
I then evaluate equation (44) with h, y,f, and σ A set to their 1996 (mid-sample) points on the trend lines in Figure 1 and Panels A through C in Figure 4 . This calculation gives c/M = 4.37 × 10 −4 . One can interpret this value in the context of the implied separate value for c by conditioning on M in that same mid-sample year. To get a rough estimate of M, I add the number of active mutual funds in the dataset constructed by Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) to the number of institutions other than mutual funds filing Form 13F with the SEC, as provided by Thomson Reuters. In 1996 this estimate of M equals 2212, giving an implied value of c = 0.967. In other words, at this mid-sample value, the proportional cost of taking an active position is approximately equal to the position's fraction of the stock's total market capitalization.
The parameter k determines the distribution of noise-trader weights, as in Figure 3 . I specify k as the value that solves the equilibrium relation for y in equation (25) when h, y, andf again equal the 1996 points on the trend lines in Figure 1 and in Panels A through C of Figure 4 . The parameter k enters the relation for y via the mispricing measure, ψ, and the value of ψ for a given k is evaluated numerically using equation (43). The result of this calculation gives k = 0.215, yielding a distribution for noise-trader weights very close to the case of k = 0.2 plotted in Figure   3 . Recall that a distribution with that shape arises from commonality in portfolios across noise traders, such that low diversification at the individual level survives aggregation to a substantial degree.
C. Model Trends Versus the Data
I next explore the extent to which the model, calibrated using a single mid-sample year, can produce the investment trends observed in the years before and after. I first compute the implied values of the market-adjusted volatility (tracking error) σ A conditional on the sample trend values for h, y, andf . These values for σ A do not depend on the value specified for the parameter k. I then examine the implied values for the active allocation, y, conditional on the trend values for h andf and all of the parameters. The model's implied values for active management's tracking error computed using equation (28) are plotted as the dashed line in Figure 5 . The implied σ A 's exhibit a significant negative trend, declining from nearly 1.8% in 1980 to 1.2% in 2012. Moreover, the decline is only slightly less steep than the data-based trend, which declines from nearly 2% in 1980 to 1% in 2012. It appears that the model as calibrated does indeed produce a declining trend in tracking error that it is fairly similar to what the mutual-fund data exhibit.
The product yf is determined in equilibrium, but the active allocation, y, and the fee rate,f , are not determined separately. I therefore condition on the sample trend values forf and then compute the values for y using equation (25) . The model's implied y values are plotted as the dashed line in Panel A of Figure 6 . The model's y values exhibit a clear declining trend, so the model's implications are in qualitative agreement with the trend in the data. Also apparent in the plot is that the model as calibrated is in a sense too successful in producing such a trend: the model's trend values for y decline from about 120% in 1980 to less than 50% in 2012, whereas the data trend in y over those same years declines from 92% to 68%. From equation (25), we can see that for the given decline in h, closer agreement between the model and data trends in y would require either a steeper decline in the fee rate,f, or a less steep decline in the mispricing measure, ψ.
The mispricing measure, ψ in equation (43), declines as h declines while k is held constant.
The reason for the decline in ψ in that setting is simply because θ falls as h falls. Recall that θ, given in equation (34), is the fraction of noise-trader mispricing left uncorrected, and θ is an increasing function of h. One might ask whether assuming that k remains constant while h declines is the most reasonable assumption a priori. As h declines and presumably the population of noise traders shrinks, one might expect that aggregation across noise traders becomes at least somewhat less successful in washing out the low diversification of individual noise traders. In other words, as h declines, one might expect the density of v, illustrated previously in Figure 3 , to shift mass toward zero and become more positively skewed. Such a shift corresponds to a decrease in the parameter k.
I ask how much k must decline over the sample period in order to achieve a close correspondence between the model-implied and data-based trends in y. Recall that k is held constant at Figure 7 . Viewed from this perspective, the required decline in k seems rather modest. Moreover, even with this trend in k, the decline in θ due to the decline in h still produces a substantial overall decline in the mispricing measure ψ, which drops more than 50% between 1980 and 2012, from 0.09 to 0.04.
Active share of the aggregate portfolio is computed AS = (1/2) N i=1 |φ i |, as defined by Cremers and Petajisto (2009) . Substituting the second expression for φ i in equation (30) gives the model's implied active share,
where the second equality applies equation (32) and then (41) . Recall that the cross section of Nφ H,i − 1 is approximated by the continuous Weibull variable v. The resulting calculation of active share then becomes
The dashed line in Figure 8 plots the model-implied active share in equation (46) 
D. Negative Alpha
The model implies that α A in equation (27) is positive. This implication for the aggregate net alpha is at odds with empirical evidence on the performance of active management. Actively managed equity mutual funds-the segment of active management for which returns data are most available-have historically provided investors with net average returns below those on passive benchmarks. For example, the value-weighted portfolio of the actively managed mutual funds in the dataset constructed by Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) has an annualized estimated net alpha equal to -0.31% (t-statistic: -1.06) for the 1980-2011 period.
14 A positive net alpha occurs in equilibrium if investors have rational expectations and allocate the correct amount to active management. As discussed earlier, if investors allocate too much, the resulting alpha is lower. Consider, for example, the first year of the sample period, 1980. Under the above calibration of the model (including the modest decline in k), the value of α A in equation (27) is equal to 0.039% per annum. In other words, under rational expectations, the net alpha is slightly positive, just large enough (recalling equation 23) to induce an allocation (y) of 91% to active management when that portfolio's volatility (σ A ) is 1.75% and the index fund has γ = 0.7238.
(The values for σ A and y correspond to the model's 1980 implied values in Figure 5 and Panel B
of Figure 6 ; recall that γ is the market's variance divided by its expected excess return.) Suppose that an allocation of 91% is higher than it should be given the true degree of mispricing, and that the correct value of y is instead 70%, so that λ in Proposition 5 equals 1.3 (= 91/70). Applying equation (37) then gives a resulting net alpha of α * A = −0.31%, equal to the sample estimate for the post-1980 period. As discussed earlier, α * A is decreasing in λ, so active managers face decreasing returns to scale with respect to the size of their industry.
While it is appealing to assume that investors have rational expectations and allocate correctly, Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) show that the presence of industry-level decreasing returns to scale presents investors with an inference problem that can involve slow learning about the degree of decreasing returns and thus slow convergence to the correct allocation. Pástor and Stambaugh analyze this learning problem with a constant true underlying relation between the size of the active management industry and active management's alpha. In the current setting, that relation changes over time as the noise trader fraction h changes. Incorporating learning is beyond this study's scope, but one might suspect that moving from a stable returns-to-scale relation to one that shifts through time can only make investors' inference problem more difficult. It seems reasonable to entertain over-allocation to active management as the source of the negative estimated historical alpha. One might further entertain the retail segment of investors as being a potential source of over-allocation, at least compared to the institutional segment, given that the retail segment has allocated a greater fraction to active management despite being subject to higher fee rates.
It is important to note that in general the rational reaction by investors in aggregate to negative realized alpha is not to abandon active management entirely. Allocating too little to active management leaves investors with a lower Sharpe ratio than they could otherwise obtain, since the equilibrium alpha on active management is then too high. Of course, from a societal perspective, allocating too little to active management also creates a negative externality, in that equilibrium prices have larger errors and thus the allocation of society's resources across firms can be less efficient.
E. Fees, Noise Traders, and Future Trends
As discussed previously (Proposition 2), the model uniquely determines the product of the fee rate, f, and the active allocation, y, but does not determine those quantities individually. The product fy is the fraction of investors' stock market wealth that active managers receive as fee revenue, while the product (1 − h)f y is the fraction of total stock market value received as fee revenue.
The noise-trader fraction, h, enters the right-hand side of equation (25) at several places, including ψ, and the latter quantity is computed using numerical integration to evaluate the expectation in equation (43). As a result, the dependence of fee revenue on h is not straightforward to characterize analytically, but the function is easily plotted. Figure 9 plots both fy and (1 − h)fy as a function of h, with the model parameters equal to those calibrated earlier at the mid-sample values.
Fee revenue as a fraction of investors' stock market wealth, fy, is increasing in the noise trader fraction, h, and fee revenue goes to zero as h does. Fee revenue as a fraction of total stock market value, (1 − h)f y, is increasing in h at lower h values but decreasing at higher values. In other words, as investors own a progressively smaller fraction of the stock market, the fee revenue they pay eventually falls even though it represents an ever higher fraction of their stock market wealth. Observe that bothf and σ A approach zero as h approaches zero. In other words, in order to manage a non-trivial share of investors' stock market wealth, active managers must behave increasingly like index funds (assumed to have zero fees in the model).
IV. Conclusions
In the equilibrium model developed and calibrated here, active management corrects most of the noise-trader induced mispricing that would otherwise exist. A fraction of the mispricing remains uncorrected, because active managers are impeded by both risk and trading costs. The remaining mispricing allows investors who allocate a portion of their wealth to active management to profit (earn alpha) at the expense of noise traders. The fraction of mispricing that remains uncorrected by active management shrinks as the fraction of the equity market owned by noise traders declines. The decline in noise trading thus dictates a smaller footprint for active management. That smaller footprint can involve lower fees and lower tracking error, or a lower allocation by investors to active management, or a combination of those effects. For individual active managers as well as their overall industry, the fee revenue collected is invariant to the fee rate; a higher fee rate simply means that investors allocate correspondingly less money to be managed. Both the alpha and the market-adjusted volatility of the aggregate active portfolio are proportional to the fee rate, which therefore drops out of that portfolio's information ratio.
Active management in recent decades experienced downward trends in (i) market share, (ii) fee rates, (iii) tracking error, and (iv) deviations from benchmark stock weightings (active share). The model contains two unknown parameters in addition to those that have straightforward empirical counterparts. The first parameter governs trading costs while the second parameter characterizes the extent to which the low diversification typical of individual investors survives aggregation.
These two parameters are calibrated using mid-sample (1996) levels for the fraction of individual equity ownership, the market share of active management, the active fee rate, and tracking error. It is well known that active management in aggregate has historically under-performed passive benchmarks. If investors unwittingly allocate more to active management than is justified by the current fee rate and degree of noise-trader mispricing, then the resulting alpha on active management can become negative. In other words, the active management industry in the model exhibits decreasing returns to scale. If investors must arrive at the appropriate investment level by inferring empirically the effect of scale on performance, adjustment to the correct level of investment can be slow, as shown by Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) . A prescription that all investors react to the historical under-performance by simply reallocating everything to passive investing would be ill-advised, however, at least in the context of the model. Unless there is zero noise trading, the result would leave an unexploited positive alpha for potential active investing as well as fully uncorrected noise-trader induced mispricing. The latter would presumably impose a significant negative externality arising from allocational inefficiency.
The simple model presented here abstracts from potentially important considerations in addition to the retail-versus-institutional segmentation discussed earlier. Incorporating heterogeneity in skill and information across investment managers is likely a potentially important extension.
Also, the current model takes the information possessed by active managers as exogenous. Another worthwhile extension would be to make information acquisition endogenous, possibly an increasing function of fee revenue. These and other issues leave much for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First note that before fees and costs, the manager's market-adjusted rate of return is
The fee reduces this rate of return by f (j) . The manager's trading cost for asset i is C
and thus trading costs reduce the manager's rate of return by
The manager's net market-adjusted return is therefore
and
where the last equality uses equation (9) and the property that the R i 's are mutually uncorrelated.
To streamline notation, hereafter suppress the superscript (j) and define the N-element vectors α and φ, whose i-th elements equal α i and φ
respectively. Also define the N × N matrix P with i-th diagonal element equal to p i and all non-diagonal elements equal to zero. The portfolio parameters in equations (A2) and (A3) can then be rewritten as
The manager chooses the vector of active weights φ to maximize I A = α A /σ A subject to ι φ = 0, where ι = (1 1 · · · 1). (Recall that the manager takes α, P , and W as given.) The corresponding Lagrangian is
Differentiating with respect to φ and multiplying through by p
where ξ is the rescaled Lagrange multiplier. Multiplying through by P and rearranging gives
Note that since the market-weighted combination of the α i 's is zero, ι P α = 0. Therefore, since ι φ = 0, multiplying both sides of equation (A8) by ι implies ξ = 0, and thus
Multiplying both sides of equation (A9) by φ P −1 and rearranging gives
which implies equation (15), since total costs equal cW
Multiplying both sides of equation (A11) by α and then solving for φ α gives
which when substituted into equation (A11) gives
Equation (A13) gives equations (12) and (13), noting from equation (7) that
Substituting from equations (A10) and (A12) into equation (A4) gives
which is equivalent to equation ( Proof of Proposition 2: Applying equation (21) to equation (16), using the fund weight ω (j) in equation (19), gives
where the last equality uses the relation for g as defined earlier and used in equation (19),
which follows from the fact that since the aggregate value of the stock market is Np m , the aggregate value of the amount invested in active management is equal to using equation (20) . Similarly, applying equation (22) to equation (17) gives
Applying the equilibrium condition y = γ(α A /σ 2 A ) in equation (23) then requires that y solves
which is readily verified to have the solution in equation (25).
Proof of Proposition 3: Substitutingf y from equation (25) into the last expression in equation (A15) gives
and simplifying gives equation (27) . The first equality in equation (28) is given by the last expression in equation (A17). Substituting y from equation (25) into that expression gives
, and simplifying gives the second equality in (28). It is straightforward to verify that dividing the right-hand side of equation (27) by the rightmost expression equation (28) gives the second equality in (29). From equations (12), (13), and (19), the aggregate active weight in stock i,
i , is given by
where the second equality substitutes W (j) = g/f (j) and then applies equation (A16). This is the first equality given in (30). To obtain the second equality, substitute forf y from equation (25), which gives
given by ω (j) in equation (19), such that fee revenue is equal across managers. The aggregate active weight in stock i in that portfolio is therefore given by equation (30) with ψ equal to ψ * and y equal to y * :
The optimal allocation to the above aggregate active portfolio is given by equation (25) with ψ set to ψ * , but instead the allocation y * is λ times that optimal amount, resulting in
The market-clearing condition as stated in equation (A22) becomes
As before when proceeding from equation (A22) to (A23), substituting into equation (A27) the identities for φ H,i and φ m,i as well as φ * i in equation (A25) gives
Substituting forf y * from equation (A26) and simplifying then giveŝ
which directly yields equation (32) with θ replaced by θ * as defined in equation (36). The net alpha on the aggregate active portfolio is given by equation (A15) with y and ψ set to y * and ψ * :
Substituting forf y * from equation (A26) and simplifying gives
which is equivalent to equation (37), using equation (27). The market-adjusted variance of the aggregate active portfolio is given by equation (A17) with y set to y * :
Substituting for y * from equation (A26) and simplifying gives
and taking square roots gives equation (38) Figure 9 . Noise Trading and Fee Revenue. The figure plots the model's implied relation between fee revenue and the fraction of the equity market owned by noise traders (h). The solid line plots fy, wheref is the average fee rate and y is the fraction of investors' stock-market wealth allocated to active management. The dashed line plots (1 − h)fy, which is fee revenue as a fraction of the total value of the stock market. Black (1986, p. 531) . Kyle (1985) also advances the concept of noise traders, whom Kyle models as random in their trading. Both institutional series are constructed with estimates reported by French (2008) , who uses data from Greenwich Associates. That firm informs me that they recently adopted the policy that their data not be made available (by them or their clients) for academic research.
4 I am grateful to Martijn Cremers for supplying this active share series, computed with respect to the Russell 1000 market benchmark. The plot displays within-year averages of quarterly values.
5 In this interpretation, the trading cost is not viewed as a manager-specific price impact, such that if many other managers independently produce similar price impacts, the sum of such impacts aggregates to an implausibly large total price effect. Instead, one might imagine many intermediaries accessing different sources of liquidity or acting at slightly different times.
6 Additional empirical studies include Chen et al. (2004) , Pollet and Wilson (2008) , Yan (2008) , Ferreira et al. (2013a,b) , and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2013) . 7 Hugonnier and Kaniel (2010) obtain a similar result for an active manager who dynamically allocates to equities and a riskless asset, although when the manager invests only in equities (as here), the fee irrelevance no longer obtains. Berk and Green (2004) also present a setting in which the manager's fee revenue is invariant to the fee rate.
8 It is straightforward to verify that right-hand side of equation (34) has a positive derivative with respect to h.
9 Other studies reporting evidence of the poor diversification of individual portfolios include Kelly (1995) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) .
10 As Merton (1987) discusses, such constraints need not reflect behavioral bias and can be modeled in a rational setting.
11 For a discussion of the Weibull distribution, see for example Johnson and Kotz (1970, chapter 20) .
12 A complimentary literature analyzes how cyclical fluctuations bear on active management.
See, for example, Glode (2011 ), Kosowski (2011 ), and Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2013a .
